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I do not understand painting very well, and especially not Australian Indigenous painting,
the dot painting of Western and Central Desert artists such as Kathleen Petyarre.1 This is not
to feign naivety. The truth is: I have not had enough practice inhabiting this or any painting.
I grew up without art on the wall, among gum trees, red dirt, dying wattle, and ‘two thirds
(blue) sky’.2 While this might suggest that I inhabit the same landscape as Petyarre, I also
grew up without ‘the Dreaming’, the meaning that this dot painting is said to be about. How
and why then can this painting have the impact on me that it does? And, given the history
of colonisation in Australia, including the colonisation of Indigenous meanings, what is the
politics of the impact of that painting?
The difficulty in answering these questions begins with the ontological baggage of western
philosophy that comes with the label ‘the Dreaming’. As Howard Morphy points out, ‘the
Dreaming’ was coined by anthropologists in the late nineteenth century and, while adopted
by Aboriginal groups to refer to their varying ideas about the nature of the world, the term
erases the differences between different language groups regarding what they might mean
by ‘belonging to dreams’.3 Beyond that kind of colonisation, the term entrenches a peculiarly
western model of representation and of ‘belonging’ (that is, of the relation between self, 
world and meaning). So, for much of the twentieth century, anthropologists have said that
the Dreaming is, for Indigenous Australians, the era of creation when the Ancestors ordered
the cosmos and created the world ‘out of themselves’,4 a world with a meaning and ‘moral
authority outside the individual will and outside human creation’.5 While acknowledging
that Indigenous descendents participate in, and so inhabit and belong to, the world of the
Ancestors through ritual, storytelling and art, anthropologists have taken this contemporary
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performance of the Dreaming to be mere mimesis without difference. More recently it has
been conceded, by Alan Rumsey for example, that Indigenous descendents necessarily add
some particularity of history and culture to their performance of the Dreaming.6 While thus
attributing a degree of creativity to Indigenous artists, this still puts the Dreaming in the
realm of shared timeless myth as opposed to the history of the real world marked by evolving
social meaning and individual agency. There is, however, a third term that disrupts this
severing of what Europeans might mean by timeless Dreaming from the sociohistorical world
of the Indigenous artist’s point of view: landscape. For Indigenous Australians, the Dreaming,
according to Rumsey and others, is memorialised in country: where I see a river, Cocky
Wujungu sees a boy’s tears winding around a kangaroo’s broken elbow.7 Where I see footprints
in sand, Kathleen Petyarre sees the mountain devil lizard, the Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming
carving up the dirt and creating a world of meaning as it wanders through the land.
Hence, these paintings are now more often understood to be about landscape marked both
by the Dreaming, a timeless meaning that an Aboriginal group shares, and by the painter’s
specific social history in relation to that landscape. Fred Myers, for example, describes 
the landscape of this painting as ‘how the Dreaming has been materialized, how it has
been experienced’ rather than ‘an account of what it is’.8 While this idea of landscape adds
much complexity and sensitivity to classic western ideas of the Dreaming, more could be
done to address the implications of its neo-Kantian version where the ‘landscape’ of appear-
ance lies between a realm of timeless meaning (what the Dreaming ‘is’ itself) and the punc-
tuation of individual or group perspectives. A paradigm of coexisting but independent and
possibly incommensurate experiences of belonging to a meaningful world does not easily
account for how this dot painting has affected non-Indigenous Australians who do not have
access to any form of the Dreaming. Nor, therefore, can it account for the politics and ethics
of the transformative effects of that impact. While I too share this land of gum trees, dirt,
wattle and sky, it is not my world, my landscape, that these paintings are about. And yet, this
land and its meaning for Aboriginal Australians, engendered through belonging to it, is pre-
cisely the disputed territory of European colonisation of which I am part. On the one hand,
without Petyarre’s practice inhabiting her landscape of the Dreaming I cannot share her land-
scape: as Maurice Merleau-Ponty reminds us, while ‘the world is what we see … nonetheless,
we must learn to see it’.9 On the other hand, if I learn to see anything of Petyarre’s world
through her art this cannot, or should not, repeat the European colonisation of land and of
meaning that inflects it.10
As I am a creature of habit in the way I see, I hesitate before these paintings. My perception
is uncertain. This unsettling of my perception of another belonging to landscape that I
love provides a clue to how Petyarre’s painting could have an impact on me despite being,
in many respects, worlds of meaning apart. And because my perception is also uncertain
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about the ‘about’ that is said to connect these paintings to the landscape of the Dreaming, the
paintings’ unsettling of my perception confronts the conceptual and material colonisation
of which I have spoken. This involves addressing the enigmas of expression and access to
the landscape of the real that are belied by the ontological assumptions of notions of dreaming,
representation, and belonging to a material world that pervade our philosophical heritage.
Learning to see the art of dreaming
Through this unsettling of perception by the painting of Central and Western Desert artists,
particularly Petyarre, I am learning to see, not the content of the artists’ worlds, but the art
of dreaming. Jennifer Biddle, for example, has taught me not to view ‘dot paintings’ as iconic
representations of the real. In ‘Dot, Circle, Difference’ Biddle argues that the habit of juxta-
posing these paintings next to iconographic maps (this arrangement of dots means water-
hole, this means a lizard’s track in the sand) has encouraged the European eye to see ‘dot
paintings’, along with the Indigenous cultures that spawn them, as primitive and timeless
rather than creative and transformative.11 To see in this way, to see these paintings as pic-
torial maps of timeless myth inscribed in land, without history, culture or civil law, is to
repeat the imperialism that, as Robyn Ferrell argues, justified dispossessing indigenous
peoples in the first place of what Europeans saw as ‘untitled’ land.12 So I learn that these
paintings are about experiences of the landscape of the Dreaming. Not iconic representations
of land unmarked by history, but expressions of what Marcia Langton refers to as ‘human
intimacy with landscapes’ which engenders complex relations of ‘human and non-human
biogeography’, ‘sacred geography’, and cultural and gender-specific land practices.13 Included
in these expressions of relations to landscape would also be experiences of the history of
colonising encounters over land.14
As these dot paintings are about landscape they are also about colour. Robyn Ferrell has
also taught me about colour, through a beautiful blue photograph she captured under water
that graces the wall of my lounge room. As if to prove that it does not matter so much
what landscape the photo is of (as if the photograph re-presents another more authentic
canvas), it took a comment from a friend recently to show me that the photograph hangs
inverted and was taken from the ocean floor looking up to ripples of water touching sky,
rather than from the surface looking down to ripples of sand. This knowledge of a dif-
ferent perspective however does not shake the certainty of my perception. What informs my
perception is the blue and the patterns of light and the way both resonate with the colours
and patterns of my life. Merleau-Ponty would say, for reasons I will get to, that insofar as I
inhabit this photograph upside down or in any way at all I do so through ‘flesh’; through the
elemental intertwining of my habitual corporeal style with the world of the photograph it
achieves a metamorphosis of the world of my body through art.15
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It is Merleau-Ponty who has taught me how to appreciate painting a little more, or rather,
what is going on in that experience. His accounts of ‘expression’ explain why I can inhabit
some blues better than white; why I can feel strangely at home among the ochre reds and
yellows of Bologna upon a first visit; and why I would find myself attempting to reproduce
those colours on the outside of my house several months later without thinking and with-
out much success. It would be the materiality of the meaning that inhabits my blood, 
flesh and bone (the blue-green haze of gum trees, the blue of two-thirds sky, the yellow of
dying wattle and the ochre red of dirt) that gets animated and transformed by the affective
impact of blue, red and yellow things on me. Just as important as the style of my body’s
incarnation and expression of the landscape is the impact of the landscape on me. It may
not matter to some then whether the blue photograph was taken from the ocean floor looking
up or from the surface looking down, but the landscape that this photograph produces does
make a difference to the way the photograph orientates my body in relation to that land-
scape. Perhaps it is because I have lived too long with my feet in the sand looking up at 
two-thirds blue sky, that I can only, or at least most quietly, inhabit this photograph as the
photographer would have it: up-side down. How then do the colours and ripples of Petyarre’s
painting drag my feet out of the sand?
Cartesian dreaming versus perceptual faith through flesh
It is through his account of this strange ability of art to turn the world upside down, in terms
of the transformative intertwining of body and world, that Merleau-Ponty has taught me
to think again about the art of dreaming. It is more than simply fortuitous for this purpose
of critiquing European definitions of the Dreaming and their ontological assumptions that
Merleau-Ponty opens The Visible and the Invisible with a discussion of the epistemological
habit of contrasting dreaming and the imaginary with true vision of reality and certitude 
of perception; an ontological contrast that can be traced back to Descartes’ response to the
scepticism of Pyrrhonism.16 When, in the seventeenth century, Descartes sat by the fire in
his dressing gown to meditate about rational thought as the secure foundation for true knowl-
edge, he began his doubting about the reliability of the senses by imagining that he was
dreaming. Through this figment of imagination Descartes entrenched dreaming in the realm
of timeless myth, a realm he locates, not in the landscape of the perceived, but in the interiority
of the perceiving subject. If he were dreaming that he was sitting by the fire, then, Descartes
says, his perception that he extended his hand would be false; or if the dream coincidently
were true, if as a ‘painted representation’ the dream of the extended hand did match the real,
this would only be as a trace of perceptions of the real picked up when awake.17 Dreaming,
for Descartes, is at worst false, and at best parasitic: a passive, static, internal re-presentation
of more reliable wakeful perceptions of the physical world.
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But as Merleau-Ponty points out, the issue in this contrast between dreaming and wake-
ful perception is perceptual faith as much as truth: Descartes abandons this line of inquiry in
his pursuit of the foundations of certain knowledge, not simply because he assumes that
dreams are false perceptions, but precisely because he had no way of telling for certain whether
he was dreaming or not, and hence no way of knowing for sure whether his perceptions were
on solid ground. While Descartes eventually finds this certainty of perception in rational
thought (rather than the senses), this is not without ‘secretly’ invoking his perceptual faith
in the reality of the sensible world by way of contrasting it with the false world of dreams
and not without casting true perceptions, along with that rational thought that holds
them, back into the same ‘interior life’ of dreaming of which he seemed so uncertain.18 Given
that Descartes can only restore perceptual faith through these sleights of hand, the status
of dreaming and imagining as opposed to rational thought remains an open question. Perhaps,
after all, the world of dreaming does not remain ‘forever what it is’ or deficient in comparison
to the ‘plenum of the perceived’ world.19 And perhaps meaning, as the Dreaming, is, as
Indigenous Australians believe, located, not in ‘interior life’ but in the landscape of the
perceived. Or perhaps the landscape of the Dreaming and the perceptual faith of those who
live it take place somewhere in between. This suggestion however requires renegotiating the
relation between interior life of the perceiver and the exterior perceived world of the real and
rethinking what guarantees the certainty of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, perceptual faith
is guaranteed by the ‘flesh’, at the border between what Descartes would take to be interior
life and the perceived world. And it is this ‘expressive operation of the body’ intertwining
with the perceived world ‘that is amplified into painting and art’.20
Painting and art enter this uncertain story of the Cartesian distinction between false
dreaming and true perception through Merleau-Ponty’s critique of André Malraux’s distinc-
tion between expression in non-realist modern art and perspectival representation in classical
painting.21 Whereas classical painting aims to represent the shared perceived world of a
natural and timeless meaning through the technique of perspective, modern non-realist art,
according to Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Malraux, abandons the natural and the shared world
to express the artist’s affective and unique interiority. Merleau-Ponty admires the way Malraux,
by finding something creative and unique in the artistic expression of the interior world,
reverses the ‘objectivist prejudice’ in art. It could also be said that Malraux thus makes the
internal realm of dreaming and the imaginary a creative distortion of what Descartes would
say is a rational and shared representation of the landscape of the real. However, as Merleau-
Ponty suggests, Malraux, while not ‘objectivist’, is too ‘subjectivist’ in his haste to abandon
‘the domain of the visible world’.22 Hence, the same question of perceptual faith that Merleau-
Ponty asked of Descartes could also be asked of Malraux: Malraux no less than Descartes
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condemns the artist to solipsistic madness where the artist’s unique interiority, deprived of
any certain link with the real, would implode in on itself.
Conceiving of non-representative art in these subjectivist terms does little to alter the
Cartesian epistemology that puts dreaming and representation exclusively inside the per-
ceiving subject in the first place. Malraux’s distinction between self-referential expression and
world-directed perception keeps in place the dualism of a Cartesian theory of vision. On this
model, the rational perceiving mind corrects the two dimensional representation of lines
produced by passive mechanical vision by adding ideas of shape, size, depth and colour that
fortuitously correspond with the real.23 Hence, my ideas of shape, size, depth and colour
should ‘correct’ my deceiving eye in my perception of the blue photograph. But they do not.
When painting is said to similarly add depth, colour and so on to two-dimensional lines, 
it is figured in terms of representation of the world from the view of the mind of the artist in
a way that allows the privileging of perspective in art.24 It is the persistence of this episte-
mology and its dualist ontology that, arguably, accounts for the phenomenon that is the target
of Biddle’s critique mentioned earlier: the way Indigenous art of dreaming (and especially
dot paintings) is viewed by a European eye as an iconic (and therefore primitive) rep-
resentation of a timeless real. Equally, following Malraux, the same epistemology and dualist
ontology would support the opposite proposition: that the Dreaming, as timeless and shared
mythical meaning, takes the place of the landscape of the real and the artistic performance
of the Dreaming is abstracted from this real in an expression of the artist’s unique interiority,
marked by history, individual agency, feeling and imagination.
But what if the art of dreaming dissolves these distinctions between interior and exterior
life, between subjective perspective and an original timeless meaning, not to dissolve per-
ceptual faith as Descartes feared, but rather to realise it? What if the Dreaming is in the land-
scape but inseparable from the body that is its unique expression?25 What if expression is
neither of the artist’s unique interiority, nor of a shared and timeless real, but of something
in between? What if it is the affectivity of flesh that opens and links the two? ‘Flesh’ is Merleau-
Ponty’s challenge to the ontology and model of perception that supports the epistemological
and aesthetic distinctions between dreaming and true perception, the imaginary and the real,
feeling and things. Flesh is the ‘element’ of intertwining between the ‘the spatio-temporal
individual and the idea’ and between ‘the within and the without’, whereby my body is caught
in the fabric of the world in such a way that the visible, the landscape of the real, is neither
separable not completely merged with the vision: only through this intertwining and
‘divergence’ (écart) of flesh do we see.26 Between seeing and being seen by things, between
touching and being-touched, my style, by which I have already inhabited a world, is brought
to a fragment of being such that it has meaning.27 But as flesh is opened by the impact of the
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strangeness of the world on me, that style, and therefore meaning is transformed in a unique
expression ‘undergo[ne] from things’.28 Through that impact and its affect I see red as both
‘a punctuation in the field of red things’ and as a ‘fossil drawn up from the depths of imagin-
ary worlds’.29 With this idea of flesh Merleau-Ponty argues that it is not that in dreaming I
inhabit a phantasm in thought, while in true perception I inhabit the landscape of the real.
In both cases I belong to and express a world through the divergence of flesh. Between the
red sun and blue sea at the horizon of the world is a call to the red dirt and blue sky of my
childhood. Between this and other materialised ideas of red, the red ‘tiles of rooftops [and]
the flags of gatekeepers and of the Revolution’, I see red in the opening and divergence of
flesh.30 In an Australian context, however, insofar as the red of the landscape takes account
of the displacement of the belongings of others, red would not be seen so much through the
red flags of revolution as through the red blood of Indigenous massacres.
Learning to see petyarre’s art of dreaming
This account of expression through the impact of world on body also describes the production
of painting. Kathleen Petyarre would seem to agree that her artistic expression of the land-
scape of the Arnkerrth (Mountain Devil Lizard) Dreaming is inseparable from her everyday
style of inhabiting the world. According to her authorised spokesperson, Christine Nicholls,
Petyarre makes a direct correlation between her navigation of the landscape with her family
through childhood, and her expression of the landscape of the Arnkerrth Dreaming in
painting.31 Nicholls suggests that the artistic expression of Petyarre’s spatial knowledge of
the landscape arises from an ‘ability to reconstruct, from memory, detailed and accurate
mental maps’ of the terrain of her childhood, so accurate that her canvasses of the landscape
bear a remarkable resemblance to aerial photographs of the terrain.32 But if Petyarre’s painting
is a mental map, how did the Dreaming get into her mind and then how did it get trans-
formed from a horizontal perception of the landscape to a vertical view of the world? Too
many other matters that Nicholls reports suggest that Petyarre’s expression of the Dreaming
is not a mental map. Rather it would be an amplification of the corporeal expression of the
landscape as described above: a transformed echo of her bodily orientation toward and
expression of the land. After all, Petyarre does not exist completely apart from the landscape
of the Dreaming. Nicholls’s reports suggest that, through her inheritance of the stories of
Ancestral tracings of the land and, hence, of the meaning of the Dreaming through dwelling
with the elders and through her simultaneous bodily navigation of the land, Petyarre has
herself become the Arnkerrth Dreaming. On her own account she is that ‘bonsai dinosaur’
with her grumpy and moralising ways.33 Although, she could not be the same as the land-
scape of the Dreaming, otherwise she could not express it. There must be a difference, a
divergence of flesh, for perception and expression to take place. It is not that the Dreaming
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and its moral meanings are in Petyarre’s mind borrowed from, then re-projected onto, the
perceived world from her particular socio-historical perspective. She belongs to the land-
scape of the Dreaming through the intertwining and divergence of flesh.
Similarly, it is not that modern (‘abstract’ or non-representative) art expresses the artist’s
affective interiority, while classical (perspectival) painting represents the exterior world. 
In both cases the artist’s work is the ‘invention of a world’ that ‘adds a new dimension to this
world too sure of itself by making contingency operate within it’:34 ‘it is the expressive oper-
ation of the body … which is amplified into painting and art’.35 This expressive operation
of a body that is flesh does not impose a unique vision on the real as if perception in life or
art were unidirectional. Nor does expression, artistic or not, passively reflect a fixed meaning
already in a timeless real. The impact of the land upon the Dreaming, the real upon the ideal,
disorientates the body and inserts it into the world and into truth. Neither the Dreaming nor
the landscape, neither the imaginary nor the real, are timeless; rather, what is timeless is the
difference that opens between the two. This divergence of flesh effects a ‘metamorphosis 
of the seeing and seen’ such that all art and all perception are both of a world but also of
dreaming; or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, ‘[e]ssence and existence, imaginary and real, visible
and invisible—a painting mixes up all our categories in laying out its oneiric universe’.36 On
this account Petyarre’s painting is both an echo of the landscape of the Dreaming that she
already inhabits and a reconfiguration of it; and it is an amplification and reorientation of
her carnal intertwining with the Mountain Devil Lizard Dreaming carved out as she wanders
through the land. Insofar as the Dreaming is in the painting it is as a trace of mountain 
devil lizard tracks that give meaning to a world as the world impacts on it. That trace is time-
less, not in the sense that its meaning is fixed, but in the sense that it signifies a divergence
of flesh, a separation in the touching and being-touched, an alterity and ‘contingency’ that
transforms meaning and that is not erasable by the style or individual belonging that 
it opens.37
The way Merleau-Ponty and Petyarre bring flesh to art does not imply that non-realist
painting is more creative than ‘realist’ art: perspectival art lays out its dream universe as much
as what is deemed abstract painting. Nor does it imply that the artist, Indigenous or not, has
essentially a more open corporeal relation to a landscape, than anyone else.38 However the
idea of flesh does not flatten art to make all art equally creative expressions of a world. While
perspectival painting expresses its dream world by lifting the viewer above the lived world
to the position that tends to sediment the significance of the relations between things, 
a creative expression of a world would not.39 A creative expression of a world keeps the
divergence of flesh open, thus allowing the landscape of the visible to continue to reverberate
through the vision as the imaginary lives on in the real. Expression in such a painting is
not finished when the brush is put to rest.
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It is that art of dreaming with its trace of the timeless of alterity or the contingency of
the divergence of flesh that opens Petyarre’s painting to me. The strangeness of her painting
can only animate me, however, if it resonates with and impacts on something familiar that
matters. Her painting thus unsettles the certainty of my perception, by calling up and trans-
forming the fossils of red, blue and yellow, of dirt, trees and sky from the depths of my
imaginary worlds. In this way I am transported into the landscape of her painting. But I can
only be transported into any landscape if, from the very start, the relation between the
perceiving body and both the meaning and the landscape of the real it expresses is not a
private and direct relation. What animates the perceiving body and its perception of the
world is the opening onto and impact of the expression of other bodies. We will better under-
stand the ‘trespass of things upon their meaning … when we understand it as the trespass
of oneself upon the other and of the other on me’.40 Or, as Merleau-Ponty also puts the same
point, it is the expression of another body’s perception of a world that, in entering the field
of my body, ‘multiplies it from within’ and it is through this ‘decentering’ that, ‘as a body, I
am “exposed” to the world’.41
The idea that perception of a world is based on a fundamental intercorporeality and that,
therefore, different ‘belonging to dreams’ and belonging to land impact on each other raises
the issue of the ethics and politics of the appreciation of this Western and Central Desert art.
It is all very well that this art fascinates, inspires and animates me. But that animation and
the transformation of meaning and of belonging to landscape it effects, depends on keeping
alive the alterity or divergence of flesh that provokes it. If these paintings are not to become
just strange pictures on a wall we should be led by that strangeness, not only to an aware-
ness of the cultural differences that generates that strangeness, but also to a questioning of
the way one’s own conceptual and material worlds may close that alterity down. As Petyarre’s
is not my world, I cannot share the specifics of her perceptual faith or, therefore, the same
landscape of her expression. However, I can learn about the contingency of my own belonging
to this land and the relations with others upon which it depends. And, with practice, I could
catch a glimpse of what it might be like to inhabit a landscape not horizontally or upside
down, but from on top of the world, or, as Petyarre puts it, ‘looking from the sky’.42
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